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Abstract
Phenomenology and cognitive science present two very different ways of looking
at mental activity. Recently, however, there have been some attempts to incorporate
phenomenological insights and methods into cognitive science, drawing especially on the
works of Martin Heidegger. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if a useful
combination of cognitive science with Heidegger’s phenomenology is possible, and to
determine the form such a combination might take.
This thesis begins with a brief overview of the field of cognitive science, and of
some of the problems within the field that might benefit from a phenomenological
analysis. It then reviews Winograd and Flores’ attempt to rethink cognitive science in
Heideggerean terms. Next, Heidegger’s work is analyzed in order to see how scientific
experimentation is viewed in his phenomenology. Finally, this thesis argues that any
useful attempt at reconciling cognitive science and phenomenology must start from a
phenomenological, rather than a scientific, standpoint.
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Chapter 1
The Computational Model of Mind and its Critics
1.1 Introduction
Contemporary analytic philosophy of mind is closely linked to the discipline
known as cognitive science, perhaps the most popular contemporary attempt at a
scientific study of the mind. At the same time, most continental philosophy can trace its
origins back to the phenomenological movement of the early twentieth century. Both
cognitive science and phenomenology deal with questions of what it means to be human,
and how we are able to interact with one another and with the world. Yet the two fields
follow very different methodologies, and sometimes arrive at very different conclusions.
Nevertheless, attempts have been made at reconciling the differences between the
cognitive and phenomenological approaches, in the hopes of arriving at a more complete
picture of human experience. This thesis will examine the views of the human mind
offered by both cognitive science and phenomenology, paying special attention to the
phenomenology of the early Heidegger, in order to see if there is anything to be gained
by combining the two fields.

1.2 A brief history of cognitive science
The term “cognitive science” refers broadly to a movement within
psychology and related fields over the last half-century which aims at a scientific
understanding of mental activity. It is difficult to give a strict definition of the term, as its
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usage varies greatly, and nearly any discipline or theory related to the scientific study of
the mind has at some point been labeled “cognitive science.” For the sake of simplicity
and uniformity, I shall apply the term as it is used by Howard Gardner in The Mind’s New
Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution. Gardner’s book is widely recognized as
a solid introduction to the field of cognitive science, and the following overview is
largely derived from that work.
Cognitive science can be seen largely as a reaction to the failures of two
previous attempts at explaining human thought: introspective psychology and
behaviorism. Introspective psychology presupposes the ability of a subject to examine
the contents of his or her own consciousness. One of the early proponents of this
approach was Franz Brentano. Brentano saw the mind as an active agent, and the
primary object of psychology as the intentional act, a mental act directed at some object.
For Brentano, the mind was not something that could be observed from the outside in the
manner of a scientific experiment. Instead, one must become aware of one’s own
phenomenal experience in the course of one’s everyday life (Gardner 101-2). Brentano is
probably best known today as one of the major influences on Edmund Husserl, and is
generally considered the forerunner of the field of phenomenology. The emphasis on
lived experience and a distrust of scientific “objectivity” have continued to be hallmarks
of the phenomenological approach.
Another major figure in the history of introspective psychology is Wilhelm
Wundt. Like Brentano, Wundt felt that psychology was properly concerned with
conscious experience. Unlike Brentano, however, Wundt believed that some measure of
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scientific objectivity was needed if psychology was to produce reliable results. Wundt
championed the idea of psychology as an endeavor carried out by trained observers who
have learned to chronicle their own inner experiences accurately and objectively.
Philosophically, Wundt was an heir to the British empiricist tradition, preserving Hume’s
distinction between impressions and ideas; introspection’s task was to analyze one’s
complex ideas and identify the impressions with which they were associated (Gardner
102-4). Wundt’s program fell out of favor when psychologists began questioning the
reliability of introspection, as well as the empiricist assumption that all ideas are the
product of impressions, and therefore available to one’s conscious introspection. A new
breed of psychologists emerged who posited that a great deal of mental activity might be
unconscious, and that psychology ought not confine itself to studies of mental imagery
(106).
The pinnacle of the anti-introspective movement within psychology was
behaviorism, perhaps best known for its “black box” approach to the psyche: no attempt
is made to posit mental entities such as thoughts, ideas, and emotions, or to provide a
physical basis for cognition through the study of neuroanatomy. Instead, cognition is
analyzed purely in terms of stimuli and responses. Through a series of meticulously
designed experiments, the behavioral psychologist attempts to determine the
correspondence between the various stimuli (or sensations) experienced by an organism
to that organism’s responses (actions, behaviors). The organism (human or animal) is
seen as being essentially passive: its range of behaviors consists entirely of reactions to
changes in its environment.
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Behaviorism was important because it represented a shift in the perception
of psychology from Geisteswissenschaft to Naturwissenschaft. Behavioral psychology
shared with the natural sciences the assumption that the objects of its study were
governed by a set of rules, and that these rules could be discovered through the process of
scientific experiment. It also resisted the tendency to draw a sharp line between animal
and human behavior: humans were seen as following the same pattern of stimulus and
response as any animal. Finally, behaviorism dismissed any talk of “free will” or
subjective experience as unscientific, preferring to describe human and animal cognition
from a detached, third-person perspective.
As important as behaviorism was, it ultimately failed to produce a
completely convincing model of behavior, especially with respect to humans.
Behavioral psychologists were at a loss to explain how a simple correspondence between
stimuli and responses could account for a wide range of incredibly complex human
behaviors. Critics such as Karl Lashley and Noam Chomsky demonstrated that certain
phenomena, such as the acquisition and use of language, could not be accurately
explained in behaviorist terms. Eventually it became clear that any truly scientific
approach to explaining human cognition must eschew the “black box” approach in favor
of a more complex model of the mind. The successor movement to behaviorism, which
sought to provide such a model, became known as cognitive science.
Cognitive scientists strive for a “middle ground” of interpretation. Unlike
eliminative materialists such as “neurophilosophers” Paul and Patricia Churchland, they
do not attempt to explain human behavior purely in terms of neuroanatomy or brain
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chemistry, a move which would effectively reduce psychology to biology, or even
chemistry and physics. Yet unlike the behaviorists, cognitive scientists do not treat the
mind as a “black box” to be analyzed purely in terms of inputs and outputs. One of the
hallmarks of cognitive science is “the assumption that, for scientific purposes, human
cognitive activity must be described in terms of symbols, schemas, images, ideas, and
other forms of mental representation” (Gardner 39).
A second distinguishing feature of cognitive science is its close relationship
to the field of computer science. Most cognitive scientists share the assumption that
human and animal cognition are at least in some way analogous to the information
processing and decision-making which takes place inside a digital computer. Of
particular interest is the field of artificial intelligence, the attempt to simulate human
cognition with computer software. Most artificial intelligence systems are designed to
perform a certain task without concern for verisimilitude – for example, a computer
vision system designed to scan airports for wanted fugitives might bear little or no
resemblance to the human vision system. More important for cognitive science is the
intersection between artificial intelligence and experimental psychology, in which
computers are designed to mimic as closely as possible the actual mental processes of
human beings. The importance of artificial intelligence to cognitive science, and the
extent to which computers and human minds are similar, are points of contention among
cognitive scientists.
Proponents of the computational model of mind are inclined to see the
human brain and a digital computer as essentially similar in kind. Under this model,
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human reasoning is procedural and rule-based, just like a computer program; the task of
the cognitive scientist is to “reverse-engineer” the human mind, or to attempt to decipher
the program which gives rise to human behavior. Crucial to the computational model of
mind is the distinction between software – symbolic representations of information and
an encoded set of rules for processing those symbols – and hardware, or the machinery on
which the software is implemented. Under the computational model, the term “mind” is
associated with software, the proper domain of the cognitive scientist, while “brain”
refers to the hardware, the domain of neuroscience. In order to explain some mental
activity under the computational model, it is sufficient to produce an algorithm, or
software-level description; there is no need to describe cognition at the hardware level in
terms of physical brain activity.
The computational model’s distinction between software and hardware, or
mind and brain, may seem reminiscent of the mind-body distinction drawn by Descartes.
However, there are important differences between the substance dualism of Descartes and
the mind-brain distinction as understood by cognitive science. Software and hardware, or
mind and brain, represent different levels of abstraction, rather than distinct metaphysical
entities. As an analogy, consider the disciplines of physics and chemistry: a given
system can be described in chemical or in physical terms, yet both approaches describe
the same system. Furthermore, any chemical description is, at least in theory, reducible
to a physical description: a chemical reaction between, say, an acid and a base can also be
described in terms of electron exchanges between ions or molecules. The fact that
chemistry and physics represent separate, though related, disciplines means that one

6

might be able to arrive at a satisfactory chemical description of a reaction even before the
underlying physics is understood. The science of chemistry was already quite advanced
before the modern (physical ) model of the atom was developed. Likewise, it is
conceivable that a cognitive scientist can produce a satisfactory model of the mind even
without fully understanding the underlying neuroscience.
There is an interesting and philosophically important consequence of the
mind/brain distinction under the computational model. Computer programs generally
have a degree of platform independence – the same program may be implemented on
various different types of hardware. For example, a simple addition algorithm that
produces the sum of two numbers might be implemented on a mechanical adding
machine, a pocket calculator, a desktop computer, or even a human brain. The exact
physical states of the hardware are irrelevant, as long as there is a direct causal
correlation between the physical states of the hardware and the formal states of the
computation.1 Since, under the computational model of mind, the mind is only a
specialized type of computation, this means that any properly configured system, whether
natural or artificial, could be said to possess a mind simply by implementing the right
computation.
One of the standard questions in analytic philosophy of mind is the
“problem of other minds,” the question of whether one can justifiably overcome
solipsism and assert that there exist other beings capable of possessing thoughts or mental
states. For the believer in the computational model of mind, this problem is fairly easily
1For a more detailed discussion of what is required for a physical system to implement a program, see
David J. Chalmers' “On Implementing a Computation” from Minds and Machines (1994).
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solved: to have a mind is to implement a computation which performs certain mental
tasks. Any physical system which implements such a computation – i. e., which is
functionally equivalent at the software level to the human brain – can be said to have a
mind. This means not only that we can attribute mental states to other humans; it also
implies that we could justifiably attribute mental states to a computer, provided it is
running the right program. By accepting the computational model of mind, one is easily
led to accept the strong interpretation of artificial intelligence: AI software is more than a
simple simulation of thought – it is thought, and a sufficiently advanced AI might even be
considered a person.

1.3 Critics of the computational model
Many philosophers have been reluctant to accept the implications of the
computational model of mind; to them it seems that there is a fundamental difference
between human thought and the rote rule-based behavior of digital computers. One of
the most famous criticisms of the computational model of mind comes from John Searle.
In “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Searle introduces his “Chinese Room” thought
experiment to demonstrate the dissimilarity between computer information processing
and human thought. He takes as his inspiration a computer program by Roger Schank,
which is capable of reading English-language stories and producing correct answers to a
limited range of questions about the stories. Some proponents of strong artificial
intelligence might say that Schank’s program actually understands English, at least to
some degree, and that what occurs when the program answers questions about stories is
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essentially the same as what occurs when a human answers the same questions (Searle
183-4). To show that the computer does not actually understand anything, Searle asks us
to consider the following scenario: A human being with no knowledge of the Chinese
language is placed in a room along with a stack of cards, on which are written various
instructions. Through a slot in the door, someone outside the room passes a story written
in Chinese, along with questions about the story, also in Chinese. By following the
instructions written on the cards – instructions which involve nothing more than the
manipulation of symbols – the person inside the room is able to write Chinese characters
onto a piece of paper and pass it through the slot to the outside. To a native Chinese
speaker outside the room, the symbols on the paper appear to be accurate and
grammatically correct Chinese-language replies to the questions about the story. The
Chinese speaker might be tempted to conclude that the person inside the room
understands Chinese. Yet the inhabitant of the room does not; all he has been doing was
manipulating symbols, with no knowledge of their meaning (184-6).
Searle’s thought experiment appeals to our intuitions about the nature of
cognition in order to convince us that computation is not the same thing as thinking.
However, it is difficult to tell exactly how they differ in Searle’s view. It is clear, for
example, that Searle does not wish to return to Cartesian substance dualism by imagining
a reified mental substance possessed by humans but not computers; in fact, he accuses the
proponents of the computational model of advocating a form of dualism themselves
(203). Nor does Searle simply presuppose that machines cannot think. On the contrary,
he asserts “that only a machine could think, and indeed only very special kinds of
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machines, namely brains and machines that had the same causal powers as brains” (203).
Whatever makes thought possible for Searle must be compatible with a materialistic and
mechanistic world-view.
Surprisingly, the “missing ingredient” of human thought is a concept more
typically associated with phenomenology than cognitive science: intentionality. Searle
argues against the mind-software/brain-hardware analogy by saying that “the same
program could have all sorts of crazy realizations which have no form of intentionality.”
Any of a variety of mechanical systems could instantiate a program which responds to
questions about Chinese stories, but non-biological machines “are the wrong kind of stuff
to have intentionality in the first place (only something that has the same causal powers
as brains can have intentionality)”. Intentional states, says Searle, “are defined in term of
their content, not their form” (200).
Searle’s main concern seems to be that, in the case of computer information
processing as well as the rule-following person in the Chinese room, symbols are being
processed strictly as symbols, with no attention being paid to their meaning. His usage of
the term “intentionality” implies more than simply being-directed-toward (for a computer
can in a sense be said to be “directed toward” its data, just as a camera can be “directed
toward” its subject), but a sort of concernful dealing. For one to understand information
– as opposed to merely processing it – one must be engaged with it in more than a
superficial manner; the information has to mean something. Searle’s dissatisfactions with
the computational theory of mind hint at a phenomenological understanding, yet Searle is
firmly committed to a scientific world view. Intentionality for Searle must come from
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the brain, not from a Cartesian ego or other such metaphysical entity. Thus he must rely
on the nebulous concept of “causal powers” – something he never adequately defines – to
explain how intentionality arises from the human brain. Whatever these causal powers
are, Searle apparently believes it is up to biology to find them: “Whatever else
intentionality is, it is a biological phenomenon, and it is as likely to be causally dependent
on the specific biochemistry of its origins as are lactation, photosynthesis, or any other
biological phenomena” (204). The notion that biology can account for phenomenology is
an interesting one, and we shall later investigate it at length. Nevertheless, there is
something ultimately unsatisfactory about Searle’s critique. Like Brentano, and the
phenomenologists after him, Searle sees intentionality as an integral feature of mental
activity; however, his insistence on preserving the materialistic and mechanistic
assumptions of cognitive science lead him to posit some vague “power” to explain
intentionality.
Another critic of the standard view of cognitive science is Rodney Brooks.
As a robotics researcher, Brooks does not share Searle’s view that intelligence is a strictly
biological phenomenon, or that intentionality is something of which machines are not
capable. He does, however, question the emphasis within the field of artificial
intelligence on knowledge representation. Traditional artificial intelligence (what John
Haugeland refers to as “good old-fashioned AI” or “GOFAI”) takes a fairly Humean
view of cognition: sensory inputs (impressions) are converted to data (simple ideas)
which might be processed at various levels of abstraction (complex ideas). A robot
which was designed to find its way around a room, for example, might be equipped with
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a vision system designed to take the raw input from a camera and search for specific
objects with labels like “chair” and “door”. Its programming would contain instructions
like “move around the chair and toward the door.” For Brooks, this representationalist
approach is far removed from the way actual humans and animals interact with the world,
and deals in needless abstractions.
Brooks contends that “reasoning,” the type of thought which deals mainly
with abstractions and representations, is far from the most basic form of cognitive
activity, and that much behavior can be explained in much simpler terms. He uses an
example first proposed by Herbert Simon: an ant walking along a beach might appear to
be following a very complex path, but the complexity is really only a reflection of the
complexity of the ant’s environment (Brooks 418). The ant simply reacts to obstacles in
its path by walking around them; this behavior is made to seem more complicated
because of the great variety of the terrain. Brooks’ approach to explaining human and
animal behavior is not to conceive of a central computational system which performs
logical operations on mental representations, but rather to propose a number of simple
systems working in parallel, which are concerned more with action than with information
processing.
Unlike many artificial intelligence systems, Brooks’ robots (which he calls
“Creatures,” referring to the fact that they are designed in imitation of simpler animals
like insects and reptiles rather than humans) are not designed to operate in a special
laboratory environment, but in the real world: “on power-up, they exist in the world and
interact with it” (408). Traditional AI systems, for Brooks, “are not participating in a
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world at all” (416) but rather deal exclusively with the “model world” which has been
programmed into them in order to serve as a representation. The individual systems
which make up a Creature are extremely simple: a Creature designed to move toward a
light source might have a light-following system that simply turns the Creature toward
the brightest light source, and an obstacle-avoiding system which can override the other
system and turn the Creature away from objects in its path. None of the individual
systems meets the traditional definition of “cognition,” but, acting in concert, they
manage to produce behavior which seems goal-oriented and intelligent.
Many features of Brooks’ approach to cognitive science – the emphasis on
embodiment, the notion that a Creature must have a “world,” the rejection of mental
representations – are reminiscent of the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger as
described in his Being and Time. Brooks responds to this comparison by saying that he
was not specifically inspired by Heidegger, but does not object to his work “being used in
philosophical debate as an example on any side of any fence” (415). The fact that Brooks
was not inspired by Heidegger – that he arrived, through engineering research, at many of
the same conclusions Heidegger arrived at through phenomenological investigation,
suggests that the possibility of cooperation between the fields of cognitive science and
phenomenology might not be completely farfetched. If so, scientific experimentation
might be able to provide insights to phenomenologists, and phenomenology might help
inspire scientific research. In fact, some attempts have been made at combining cognitive
science and phenomenology, and we will next take a detailed look at one such attempt in
particular.
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Chapter 2
One Attempt at a Heideggerean Approach to Cognitive Science
2.1 Introduction
Martin Heidegger's Being and Time presents a detailed phenomenological
account of human existence, and challenges many assumptions about the nature of
perception, knowledge, and activity. In recent years this work has gained attention from
within fields such as cognitive science and analytic philosophy of mind, which have
traditionally stressed a view of human existence which is thoroughly nonphenomenological. It is hoped by some within these traditions that Heidegger's analysis
would be helpful in clearing up some of the perceived problems generated by
computational or representational theories of cognition. Terry Winograd and Fernando
Flores, in their book Understanding Computers And Cognition, attempt to replace the
standard cognitive model with one inspired, in part, by Heidegger; however, the result is
ultimately disappointing. By failing to appreciate Heidegger's attempt at an analysis
which is both primordial and pre-theoretical, and instead treating his work as one theory
of mind among several, Winograd and Flores overlook the most important and
distinguishing features of Heidegger's philosopy. The result is an account which bears
superficial similarities to Heidegger, but is still thoroughly grounded within the very
tradition they seek to criticize.
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2.2 Winograd and Flores’ Understanding Computers and Cognition
Winograd and Flores use the term “rationalistic tradition” to denote the
prevailing view which they claim has produced the assumptions behind current theories
of cognition. This is not to be confused with the “rationalism” of Descartes or Leibniz,
though those thinkers can be placed within that tradition; rather, the “rationalistic
tradition” refers to the methodological assumptions which are to some degree shared by
Western thought as a whole. They identify three steps in this methodology: a
characterization “in terms of identifiable objects with well-defined properties,” the search
for “general rules that apply to situations in terms of those objects and properties,” and
the attempt to “Apply the rules logically to the situation of concern, drawing conclusions
about what should be done” (Winograd 15). They will then “attempt to show the nonobviousness of the rationalistic orientation and [. . .] reveal the blindness that it
generates” (17).
In the field of cognitive science, the rationalistic tradition takes the form of
the computational model of mind. This model stems from the assumption that cognition
is a special case of symbol manipulation, such as takes place within digital computers. A
cognitive system (such as a human being) gathers information about the world which is
stored in the mind in the form of symbolic representations. These representations are
then manipulated according to an internal set of rules, of which the individual himself
may not be consciously aware. The end result of this symbol manipulation is an action
on the part of the cognitive system. Cognitive science thus becomes a matter of “reverse
engineering,” or attempting to discover the mental program which converts perceptions to
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actions: “A theory of cognition can be couched as a program in an appropriate symbolic
formalism such that the program when run in the appropriate environment will produce
the observed behavior” (25).
As its name implies, cognitive science takes cognition to be the fundamental
mode of human involvement with the world. Even in our everyday practical activities we
are assumed to be performing some form of cognition. If a cognitive scientist wishes, for
example, to explain how I am able to perform a simple task like opening a door, he would
do so in computational and representational terms. The task would be broken down into
broad subtasks like perception and action. Perception might involve some form of
pattern recognition in which I compare the raw data of my vision to a mental
representation of a door, in order to identify the object before me as a door and locate its
knob. Action would take the form of an algorithm which calculates the precise way in
which I need to move my arm in order to make contact with the doorknob, turn it, and
push the door open. I am of course not consciously performing these calculations. They
are assumed to take place in some form in my brain, and it is the task of cognitive science
to uncover them.
It is not hard to see that this view of the primacy of cognition runs counter to
Heidegger's philosophy. He describes cognition “as a founded mode of Being-in-the
world” (BT 101). In other words, however important it might be, cognition is not the
primordial mode in which we are engaged with the world. Cognition treats objects as
present-at-hand, as mere things. In treating this mode of being as primordial, traditional
cognitive science assumes that there must be some way to explain everyday activities in
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terms of dealings with mere things. The door is first a meaningless collection of sense
data before I see it as a door, and there must first be a series of kinematic calculations
before I can move my arm to open it. But for Heidegger, instrumentality is more
primordial than cognition: “The kind of dealing which is closest to us is as we have
shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates
things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of 'knowledge'” (BT 95).
Winograd and Flores agree that the computational, representationalist model
does not give an accurate account of human cognition. They turn instead to Heidegger
because of his view “that cognition is not based on the systematic manipulation of
representations.” However, they are careful to distinguish their own work from that of
other followers of Heidegger, such as Dreyfus and Haugeland, which “seem at first sight
to deny the physical basis of human action.” The link by which they seek to connect the
Heideggerian non-representational stance with a physical model of cognition lies in the
works of neurobiologist Humberto Maturana, who “sets out a conceptual framework in
which phenomena of interpretation arise as a necessary consequence of the structure of
biological beings” (Winograd 10).
In one passage, for example, Winograd and Flores criticize the
representationalist stance by making use of Heidegger's distinction between
instrumentality and objectivity:
The common sense of our tradition is that in order to perceive and relate to
things, we must have some content in our minds that corresponds to our
knowledge of them. If we focus on concernful activity instead of on
detached contemplation, the status of this representation is called into
question. In driving a nail with a hammer (as opposed to thinking about a
hammer), I need not make use of any explicit representation of the hammer.
17

My ability to act comes from my familiarity with hammering, not my
knowledge of a hammer (Winograd 33).
However, Winograd and Flores do not stop with Heidegger. Working as
they are from within the scientific tradition, they feel the need to bolster this
interpretation with biological evidence. Such evidence is provided by Maturana, who, in
studying the vision system of the frog, found that it did not simply transmit raw images to
the brain, but rather performed certain functions previously thought to be the domain of
cognition. For example, a particular type of optic nerve fiber “responded best to a small
dark spot surrounded by light,” such as a fly would appear (Winograd 41). This indicated
that the frog's fly-catching activities did not necessarily depend on a mental concept or
representation of “fly,” but were instead at least partly the result of non-cognitive activity
in the vision system itself.
Another of Maturana's experiments involves a setup wherein a stick is
illuminated on one side by a white light, and on another by a red light. One of the
shadows cast by the stick appears green to a human observer, despite the fact that no light
of the green wavelength can be detected. This led him to postulate “that the patterns of
neural activity produced are the same as those produced by light of a single wavelength
normally called green” (Winograd 41). From these and other examples, Winograd and
Flores conclude that the nervous system is “a generator of phenomena, rather than [. . .] a
filter on the mapping of reality” (42).
Are these neurological accounts true to the spirit of Heidegger's analysis of
Dasein? Has Maturana provided experimental verification of Heidegger's antirepresentationalist stance? If we begin from a truly Heideggerian standpoint, the answer
18

to the first question must be negative, and the second question should not even have been
asked. Unlike Heidegger, Winograd and Flores are not practicing phenomenology, but
instead attempting to borrow phenomenological concepts for use in an enterprise which is
still fundamentally scientific. Their failure lies in not realizing that scientific activity is
itself a particular mode of engagement. Scientific evidence cannot be used to bolster
phenomenological claims, for it is the phenomena themselves to which science must
remain truthful.
Modern science, to Heidegger, is a founded mode, a particular type of
investigation which is non-primordial. The transition from ancient to modern science
was a metaphysical shift characterized by a change in the types of entities with which
science was concerned. Whereas in its ordinary everydayness Dasein is concerned with
tools and items of equipment, which are associated with a range of activities, occupy a
space determined by those activities, and each have their proper place within that space,
science deals only with objects occupying a uniform, Cartesian space-time. “The
theoretical attitude,” writes Trish Glazebrook, “homogenizes not just space and time but
also the bodies that are the objects of physics. It homogenizes the objects of physics by
projecting their thinghood alike. For it is the thinghood of things that is understood
beforehand in the theoretical attitude” (55). Winograd and Flores may want to escape
this theoretical attitude and return to ordinary everydayness; however, in their desire to
find a “physical basis” for human action, they reveal that they have not truly arrived at a
primordial understanding. The hammer which I use to mend my roof is no less physical
than the nerve fiber under a microscope; it is simply revealed in a pre-scientific manner.
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Nevertheless, Winograd and Flores look to neurological evidence to explain
instrumentality. They are attempting to ground Being-in-the-world in a scientific
understanding, even as that very scientific understanding is itself founded on Being-inthe-world!

2.3 Science versus Phenomenology
Science, as a general rule, begins with the obvious, and then seeks to dig
beneath superficial appearances in order to find a deeper explanation. Thus chemistry
proceeds from observations of quantities of chemicals to theories about interactions
between molecules, and physiology moves from the observation of an animal's
appearance and behavior to theories about blood vessels and muscle fibers. So it is with
cognitive science: the ordinary activities of human beings are only the surface, and the
task of the scientist is to uncover the mental rules or programs which produce this
activity. The cognitive scientist will often find that the easiest task, such as opening a
door or identifying the face of a friend, is the most difficult to specify in computational
terms.
Phenomenology, on the other hand, has as its foundation that which is the
most obvious: the phenomena of experience themselves. It reacts against the tendency
of Descartes or Kant to posit some thing “behind” the perception, or to identify the
genesis of phenomena in categories within the mind. Instead of formulating a theory that
best explains the observations, the phenomenologist strives to make sure that his
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observations lay bare the phenomena without being covered over by theory. It seems
difficult to imagine an approach more different from scientific investigation.
Does this mean that cognitive science and phenomenology represent two
distinct and fundamentally irreconcilable approaches? Not necessarily. But it does mean
that we need to clarify the goals of each form of investigation, and identify the types of
entities with which they will be concerned. If we assume that both Heidegger's analysis
of Dasein and the neuroscientist's study of the brain and nervous system are attempts to
understand the workings of the mind, and that both have the mind or consciousness as
their object of study, we will have little if any success trying to reconcile the two. But
Heidegger is not attempting a study of mind, and his analysis is not something superficial
which needs to be supported by further scientific evidence. His subject, Dasein, is more
fundamental than either mind or consciousness.
Heidegger wastes no time outlining the scope of his investigation. He
begins Division I of Being and Time with these words: “We are ourselves the entities to
be analysed” (BT 67). What follows is to be an account of who we are, not within the
confines of a theory of mind, but in all our modes of being. Heidegger takes care to
distinguish this “we” from the objects of science: “Sciences are ways of Being in which
Dasein comports itself towards entities which it need not be itself” (BT 33). By this he
does not mean the obvious fact that science can study beings which differ ontically from
us, such as planets or microbes; the important distinction is ontological. The objects of
science appear in a different way than Dasein itself, even if we are studying the human
brain. Science objectifies; it studies entities as separate things in their own right. “But to
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Dasein,” says Heidegger, “Being in a world is something that belongs essentially” (BT
33). Winograd and Flores are rightly suspicious of a theory of mind which treats the
isolated human subject as a separate object which must relate to the world through
representations. But the scientific study of nerve fibers is just as objective, and just as
distant from a true study of Dasein.

2.4 Meaning versus Explanation
As we have seen, cognitive science is primarily concerned with the
explanation of human behavior. A model of cognition succeeds if it can account for a set
of actions given a particular set of stimuli. The fact that the mental representations and
algorithms of theories of cognition have no obvious correlates within conscious
experience is untroubling to most cognitive scientists. Theirs is a world of objects;
human beings are just the particular objects within that world which they choose to study.
In contrast, Heidegger is concerned from the start with meaning. It is “the
question of the meaning [Sinn] of Being” (BT 19) which guides his entire project in Being
and Time. No theoretical explanation of behavior, no matter how detailed, ever
constitutes “meaning” for Heidegger. “Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of
something maintains itself [. . .] The concept of meaning embraces the formal existential
framework of what necessarily belongs to that which an understanding interpretation
Articulates” (193). He goes on to explain that meaning is not a property of entities, but
belongs essentially to Dasein. Hence any investigation which does not begin with
Dasein, which concerns itself only with the scientific study of entities – whether
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traditional cognitive science or the neurophysiology of Maturana – can never truly arrive
at meaning.
Magda King's commentary on Being and Time offers a straightforward
example of the process of finding meaning. If we are told that an unfamiliar building is a
“theater,” that explanation has meaning to us only insofar as we understand “that it is a
building for the production of plays”. This in turn only has meaning in terms of our
understanding of the range of human activities involved in the production of plays.
Ultimately, it is the “world of human existence” which gives meaning to the theater
(King 6).
King goes on to explain meaning in terms of the horizon: “The world of our
own existence is the horizon in which our everyday understanding moves” (6). Once we
become engaged in, say, the pursuit of theoretical physics, our horizon shifts: “The
horizon from which things are now understood is the substantiality of matter” (6). Thus,
insofar as he is practicing science, the scientist finds meaning only within this particular
domain. Ordinary everydayness is not “meaningful” to him for this task. Yet even
experimental data are meaningful only by virtue of the fact that they belong to Dasein.
Cognitive science would then seem to have a unique problem. It seeks to
explain the entire range of human behavior. This includes the activities of ordinary
everydayness. So, in a sense, these things are meaningful to the cognitive scientist in a
way that they would not be to the theoretical physicist. This does not change the fact that
he operates within a particular horizon which includes only objective entities, and within
which he himself as Dasein does not appear. Instrumentality, care, all the things which

23

are most important to Heidegger's analysis, are not to be found in the scientific mode of
investigation. They are, however, in a sense present as absent. When we “bracket off”
our everyday concerns, they do not disappear. They continue to come into play even as
we turn our attention towards the objects of science.
If any attempt to combine the insights of Heidegger's phenomenology with
the discoveries of science is to be truly successful, it cannot proceed by attempting to
explain Dasein in scientific terms. Phenomenological investigation must come first, and
it must serve to illuminate our scientific investigations in the light of the existential
analytic of Dasein. With their attention to hermeneutics and their critique of the
“rationalistic” assumptions of cognitive science, Winograd and Flores believe they have
done just that. However, any progress they might have made is destroyed when they turn
to the neurological studies of Maturana in an attempt to provide a physical basis for the
mind. They have replaced a model which concerns itself with mental representations
with one concerned with nerve cells, and have taken what rightfully belongs to Dasein
and placed it within a biological substratum. They rightly question the assumptions
which led to the unsatisfactory picture of human existence painted by traditional
cognitive science, but would do well to question their own assumptions. The analysis
presented by Winograd and Flores can help us make some progress in reconciling the
phenomenological account of human existence with the psychological, but in order to be
truly successful, we must incorporate phenomenology on a much more fundamental
level.
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Chapter 3
Heidegger on Scientific Experiments
3.1 Introduction
If phenomenology is to be reconciled with the scientific study of the mind in
a way that does justice to phenomenology, we must not begin from within the scientific
world-view. Instead, we must from the start be true to the aims and goals of
phenomenology, and strive to find a way to view scientific data phenomenologically.
Fortunately for us, Heidegger did not avoid discussing scientific experiments. Part Two
of his Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics deals with the question of whether animals
are “world-poor,” and in the process of investigating this question Heidegger draws
heavily on biological experiments. Before we look at Heidegger’s take on the natural
sciences, we must examine the concepts and questions that led him to make use of
scientific data.

3.2 The relationship between philosophy and zoology
Heidegger does not begin his investigations from a starting point which
assumes the existence of material entities as investigated by the sciences -- a perspective
which makes it difficult to account for subjective experience. Nor does he begin from a
Cartesian ego that must prove the existence of the outside world. In Being and Time he
writes, “The ‘scandal of philosophy’ is not that this proof [of the existence of the external
world] has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and
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again” (BT 249, emphasis original). Even if we attempt to sidestep the problem of the
external world by claiming that the existence of the subject presupposes a world outside
itself, we “would still be starting with the construct of an isolated subject.” Heidegger
dismisses both the realism and idealism of modern philosophy in favor of Dasein’s
Being-in-the-world, where Dasein is not to be thought of as a entity within a larger set of
entities which make up the “world.” Rather, Dasein is identified with care, and the world
with the scope of Dasein’s concern.
Since “world” occupies such a place of prominence in Heidegger’s
phenomenology, it is vital that we elucidate just what is meant by the term. In Being and
Time, Heidegger states that he does not use the term in the usual sense, to mean “the
totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world.” Instead, he
takes “world” to mean “that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’” (BT
93). In other words, Heidegger gives the term “world” a phenomenological significance,
and does not mean it to denote a collection of objects.
The task of elucidating the meaning of “world” is Heidegger’s project in
Part Two of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. He proceeds by a comparative
examination of three theses: “the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world, man is
world-forming” (185). Heidegger begins “in the middle,” taking the thesis that the
animal is poor in world as his starting point. He considers whether this thesis should be
considered a proposition of zoology, but rejects this categorization: the statement that the
animal is world-poor is a statement of essence, which does not simply apply to all
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animals, but defines what an animal is.1 Thus “precisely because zoology deals with
animals this proposition cannot be a result of zoological investigation; rather it must be
its presupposition. For this presupposition ultimately involves [. . .] a delimitation of the
field within which any positive investigation of animals must move” (FCM 186). If the
fact that the animal is world-poor were a presupposition of zoology, it would imply that
we could not make use of any information garnered from that field in the elucidation of
the premise. Must we ignore zoology entirely, and does this make the thesis an arbitrary
one?
Heidegger replies in the negative: “The proposition does not derive from
zoology, but it cannot be elucidated independently of zoology either. It requires a
specific orientation toward zoology and biology in general, and yet it is not through them
that its truth is to be determined” (FCM 187). To our ordinary understanding, the attempt
to establish the relationship between zoology and metaphysics is a circular movement:
zoology provides us with the thesis that animals are world-poor, and this thesis is used as
a foundation for zoology. In arriving back at the starting point of our investigation, we
have moved around the circumference of a circle. Heidegger suggests that we might
focus our attention on the center of this circle, rather than attempt to escape the circle
entirely through the use of dialectic (187). The relation between metaphysics and science
is ambiguous, but this ambiguity is something we must be prepared to accept.
Heidegger claims that biology is in the position of having to defend its own
existence, to prevent itself from being subsumed into physics or chemistry. To do so,
1

The definition of the animal as “world-poor” takes precedence over our everyday usage of the term
“animal.” Should the great apes, for example, turn out not to be poor in world, they would no longer
rate the description “animal.”
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biology must arrive at a conception “of the fundamental character of living beings
themselves as something that cannot be explained or grasped at all in physico-chemical
terms” (188). Yet Heidegger is dismissive of anti-mechanistic movements, such as
vitalism, which attempt to preserve the distinctive character of biology, yet labor under
“misunderstandings as great as those that beset the mechanistic conception of life” (189).
Heidegger asks us to “bear in mind that all the disciplines that deal with life
are caught up today in a remarkable transformation, the basic tendency of which is
directed to restoring an autonomous status to life” (191). Historically, people have
tended to explain life “from the perspective of man,” or else “by means of laws adopted
from the realm of material nature” (192). Both attempts fail to secure “the essential
nature of life in and of itself” (192, emphasis original).

3.3 Animals as poor in world
After considering the question of the proper relationship between
philosophy and zoology, Heidegger returns to the thesis that animals are poor in world.
He admits that this thesis is counterintuitive in light of the work of J. von Uexküll, who
speaks frequently of the animal’s “environmental world” (192). Nevertheless, Heidegger
maintains that the sphere of things to which an animal can relate as a living being is much
smaller than that of a human: “The bee, for example, has its hive, its cells, the blossoms
it seeks out, and the other bees of the swarm. The bee’s world is limited to a specific
domain and is strictly circumscribed” (193). The bee’s world is limited in penetrability
as well as range: a worker bee can know the stamens of blossoms, “but it does not know
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the stamens of these blossoms as stamens, it knows nothing about the roots of the plant
and it cannot know anything about the number of stamens or leaves, for example” (193).
The lack of such knowledge is not due to mere ignorance on the part of the bee,
something that could be corrected by the bee’s coming into contact with the proper
phenomena. Rather, the bee is “world-poor” compared to man because it does not even
have the possibility of knowing these phenomena.
Heidegger next compares the world-poverty of the animal to the worldabsence of the stone: “Neither the stone nor the animal has world. But this not-having of
world is not to be understood in the same sense in each case” (196). Whereas animals are
deprived of world, stones are incapable even of being deprived of world. To clarify this
point, Heidegger accepts a provisional definition of world as “those beings which are in
each case accessible and may be dealt with, accessible in such a way that dealing with
such beings is possible or necessary for the kind of being pertaining to a particular being”
(196). A stone that is touching the earth does not bear a relationship to the earth which is
in any way similar to that of the lizard who basks on a warm stone. A stone is something
that simply “turns up,” but has no access to any other beings. In contrast, the lizard
basking on the stone “has sought out this stone and is accustomed to doing so. If we now
remove the lizard from its stone, it does not simply lie where we have put it but starts
looking for its stone again” (197). The lizard is not one being, present at hand, among
others; it has its own relation to the rock, which the rock can never have to another being.
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3.4 The bee experiments
Heidegger delves into the question of exactly what constitutes the animal’s
world in much greater detail with the example of the bee, and this example gives us
perhaps the best picture of the relationship between Heidegger’s phenomenology and
scientific experiment. Heidegger considers the behavior of the bee as it goes in search of
pollen. An individual bee will become fixated on a particular type of flower, visiting
only flowers of that type and ignoring all others, for weeks at a time. Its search for food
“is no mere flying about but is a flying directed toward one particular scent.” Once the
bee finds a drop of honey2 in a flower, it “sucks it up, stops sucking, and flies away
again.” Heidegger questions the reason for the bee’s behavior: “But does the bee
recognize the fact that the honey is no longer present? Does it fly away because it has
recognized this fact?” Heidegger does not think that we should hasten to say that the bee
has recognized the honey as present, “especially if we can and indeed must interpret the
bee’s activity as a driven performing and as drivenness, as behaviour – as behaviour
rather than comportment on the part of the bee toward the honey which is present or no
longer present” (FCM 241).
In order to answer the question of whether the bee’s actions should be
considered as behavior or comportment, Heidegger looks to a particular experiment: “A
bee was placed before a little bowl filled with so much honey that the bee was unable to
suck up the honey all at once. It begins to suck and then after a while breaks off this
driven activity of sucking and flies off, leaving the rest of the honey still present in the
2 Heidegger is probably referring to the nectar in the flower, rather than to honey, the product of the bees’
labor.
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bowl.” We are tempted to say that the bee has recognized the fact that there is more
honey present than it can consume. However, the experimenter then cuts away part of
the bee’s abdomen, so that the honey, as it is consumed, runs out the back of the bee.
Now the bee keeps consuming honey until there is no more. The bee “recognizes neither
[the presence of too much honey] nor even – though this would be expected to touch it
more closely – the absence of its abdomen. There is no question of it recognizing any of
this, it continues with its driven activity regardless precisely because it does not recognize
that plenty of honey is still present. Rather, the bee is simply taken by its food” (242).
When the bee’s abdomen is intact, the bee quits consuming honey because it
has become satisfied. The bee’s “sense of satisfaction is registered as long as [. . .] the
animal remains organically intact” and “cannot be registered in the bee if the abdomen is
missing.” Satiation “inhibits the bee’s driven activity,” and “is never a recognition of the
presence of nourishment or of the amount of nourishment available” (242). The bee’s
feeding is an instinctual activity, and “Instinctual activity is not a recognitive selfdirecting toward objectively present things, but a behaving” (243).
Heidegger next considers the question of how a bee finds its way back to the
hive. At issue is whether the bee has a “space” in the phenomenological sense. He tells
us that “there is orientation only where space is disclosed as such, and thus where the
possibility of distinguishing different regions and identifiable locations within these
regions is also given.” Heidegger questions whether the bee “opens up a space as space
and flies through it as its spatial flight-path” (243).
Heidegger considers various factors that might allow bees to find their way
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back to the hive. Color would seem to be a factor, since beekeepers will paint hives
different colors so that bees do not return to the wrong hive. Additionally, bees can
“direct themselves according to the scent which they themselves emit” (244), allowing an
individual bee to find the particular swarm to which it belongs. While both color and
scent play important rules, they are useful only over short distances, and cannot explain
how bees are able to find their way back over a distance of several kilometers. To answer
this question, Heidegger again consults experimental evidence.
In the experiment, the beehive is moved a few meters after the bees have
been released. When they are ready to return home, the bees make their way to the
empty spot where the hive had once stood. They “now become suspicious at the empty
spot and eventually find their hive after some searching about” (244). The fact that the
bees make their way first to the spot where the hive had been, but no longer was, suggests
that some feature of the environment, rather than the color or scent of the hive itself
guides them. The use of trees or other objects as landmarks is ruled out, as the bees can
successfully navigate even in barren landscapes. One final hypothesis is proposed: the
bees navigate by the sun, using the angle between themselves and the sun to provide a
sense of direction.
Is the sun hypothesis “simply a last bold attempt to solve the problem
because we cannot explain the homeward flight of the bee in any other way”? In order to
find out, we must perform another experiment. In this experiment, when a bee has
arrived at its feeding place it is imprisoned in a dark box for several hours. When it is
finally released, the position of the sun has changed dramatically. Now “the newly freed
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bee will seek its hive in the wrong direction,” a direction determined by the angle
between the bee and the sun. Once it has traveled a distance equal to that between the
hive and the feeding place, “the bee stops its linear flight altogether. It then buzzes
around looking for its hive which it will eventually find as long as the distance between
the hive and its present position has not become too great” (245). Having summarized
the facts of the experiment, Heidegger turns to a philosophical evaluation.

3.5 Driven behavior and the disinhibiting ring
Heidegger asks what is going on when the bee sets out to find the hive. He
resists the temptation to say that the bee “notices” the sun’s angle and the distance
traveled, because noticing “always involves noticing something with regard to some end,
with intent to something.” The bee, however, “is absorbed by a direction, is driven to
produce this direction out of itself – without regard to the destination. The bee does not
at all comport itself toward particular things, like the hive, the feeding place and so on”
(246). Heidegger views the bee’s behavior as essentially driven. The bee has a drive to
strike out in a particular direction determined by the sun’s angle; this drive can be
overridden by the drive to return home once the bee is within the familiar environment of
the hive. All of the bee’s behavior can be described in terms of various drives which can
exert inhibitory effects on each other: “There is no apprehending, but only a behaving
here, a driven activity which we must grasp in this way because the possibility of
apprehending something as something is withheld from the animal” (247). The animal is
world-poor because it is captivated by various things – the sun, the scent of flowers, and
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so on – but never experiences beings as beings. The animal “does not possess the
possibility of attending either to the being that it itself is or to beings other than itself”
(248).
Instead of attending to the present-at-hand, “the animal surrounds itself with
a disinhibiting ring which prescribes what can affect or occasion its behaviour” (255,
emphasis original). The animal’s various instinctive drives are disinhibited, or made
active, whenever that animal comes into contact with certain features of its enviroment
(the disinhibiting ring). Heidegger recognizes the similarity of his interpretation to the
physiological concept of stimulus and response, but feels that the physiological
interpretation “is all too clearly oriented around a comparison with mechanical relations.”
One must not lose sight of the fact that whatever can be stimulated is “already related and
indeed must be related to that which is supposed to be able to stimulate it” (256). Such
prior relationship explains why a particular animal might be completely unresponsive to
certain stimuli: the animal “does not have any intrinsic drives that are oriented in this
direction. It is not instinctually open for this particular possibility of disinhibition” (257).
Heidegger credits von Uexküll with the investigations which revealed the
extent to which the organism is bound to its environment. Previous investigations “were
based upon the fundamentally misconceived idea that the animal is present at hand, and
then subsequently adapts itself to a world that is present at hand” (263). Von Uexküll
sought instead “to acquire insight into the relational structure between the animal and its
environment,” where Heidegger identifies “environment” with his own “disinhibiting
ring” (263, emphasis original). Heidegger does not agree entirely with von Uexküll, in
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particular on the latter’s interpretation of the concept of organism. Heidegger thinks von
Uexküll’s investigations could lead to “a more radical interpretation of the organism” in
which “the totality of the organism would not merely consist in the corporeal totality of
the animal,” but in the “original totality which is circumscribed by what we called the
disinhibiting ring.” Despite his philosophical disagreements with von Uexküll,
Heidegger urges us to recognize “that the engagement with concrete investigations like
[von Uexküll’s] is one of the most fruitful things that philosophy can learn from
contemporary biology” (263).

3.6 A proper approach to science
Heidegger devoted a substantial portion of his Fundamental Concepts of
Metaphysics to the philosophical interpretation of scientific experiments. It is clear that
we cannot therefore take Heidegger to be in any sense anti-scientific, or averse to the
possibility of informing phenomenological investigations with scientific data. Perhaps
the project of merging phenomenology and cognitive science is not lost. Yet we must be
careful to approach science in the proper manner. We cannot interpret an animal’s
behavior in terms of an already existing conception of the organism, whether physicochemical, vitalistic, or otherwise. Rather, we must remain open to the possibility of
reinterpreting our concept of the organism based on our observations. Our task is to gain
insight into an organism’s world, and from there to seek the essence of the organism
itself.
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Chapter 4
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science: Toward a
Reconciliation
4.1 Introduction
Chapter One of this thesis introduced some of the main tenets of cognitive
science, particularly the computational model of mind, and briefly outlined some
criticisms of these tenets. At that time it was tentatively suggested that a
phenomenological approach might be useful in overcoming the difficulties identified by
the critics. Chapter Two took a detailed look at one particular attempt at combining
phenomenology and cognitive science, and pointed out some of the faults of this
approach. Having outlined some of Martin Heidegger’s own thoughts about scientific
experiment in Chapter Three, we must now revisit the topics introduced in the earlier
chapters, in order to see if we are any closer to a truly phenomenological understanding
of cognitive science.

4.2 Brooks revisited
One of the critics of the computational model of mind introduced in Chapter One
was Rodney Brooks, and it was noted that his approach to cognitive science had some
similarities to Heidegger’s thought, despite the fact that Brooks claims not to have been
influenced by Heidegger. These similarities are now even more striking in light of
Heidegger’s explanation of the behavior of bees. Recall that the bees’ behavior was
described as purely “driven,” the result of a number of simple drives that normally keep
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each other in check. The bees’ environment played the role of a “disinhibiting ring,”
containing a number of stimuli which could cause the bees’ various drives to become
manifested as behaviors such as flying in a straight line or sucking honey. As it turns out,
Heidegger’s analysis of the bees’ behavior could also describe the functioning of Brooks’
robotic Creatures.
Brooks describes in detail the design of one of his Creatures named Allen. Allen
is composed of three layers of controlling circuits that operate largely independently of
each other. One layer is able to “communicate” with another only by suppressing or
inhibiting its control signals. For example, one layer has a wander function, which
selects a random heading and tells the robot to go in that direction. This function can be
inhibited by the collision-detecting functions of another layer, which are activated
whenever the robot’s sonar detects an object in its path (Brooks 408-11). Just as bees
will strike out in a particular direction, only to stop when a certain distance has been
traveled and begin searching for the hive, so will Allen move in one direction until an
object is detected, then stop and look for an unobstructed path.
Heidegger’s description of the bees’ driven behavior was intended in part to
illustrate the fact that the bees are world-poor: beings such as the sun and the hive are
accessible to the bees, but they can never be apprehended as sun or as beehive. Only
world-forming beings such as humans can truly comport themselves to other beings.
Likewise, Brooks intends his Creatures to serve as models for animal, rather than human,
behavior. Brooks contends that animal intelligence is far older, on an evolutionary scale,
than human intelligence, and questions the wisdom of AI researchers’ attempts to
replicate human behavior without first understanding more basic systems (Brooks 396-7).
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One of Brooks’ chief complaints about standard AI research is its use of
abstraction. He notes that most AI programs deal not with real-world data, but with “a
restricted set of simple assertions deduced from the real data by humans” (399). Brooks
cites von Uexküll’s concept of the “perceptual world” or Merkwelt, and speculates that
the point of abstraction is to ensure “that the program experiences the same ‘perceptual
world’ [. . .] as humans” (400). However, Brooks objects to the use of abstraction, on the
grounds that “each animal species, and clearly each robot species with its own distinctly
nonhuman sensor suites, will have its own different Merkwelt” (400). Recall that
Heidegger identified Merkwelt with the “disinhibiting ring,” and claimed that “individual
animals and species of animal are restricted to a quite specific manifold of possible
stimuli” (FCM 257).
Brooks is correct that abstract thinking is not the most primordial form of human
involvement with the world, and it is likely that the type of complex behavior usually
associated with human intelligence would not be possible without an underlying substrate
of simple driven systems such as Brooks designs for his Creatures. Recall Heidegger’s
distinction in Being and Time between the present-at-hand (the mode of appearing of the
hammer considered as an object) and the more primordial ready-to-hand (the mode of
appearing of the hammer while it is in use). Even when we are involved in abstract
thinking, we may still exhibit the driven behavior of animals. But while it may be foolish
to begin an analysis of human behavior with abstract thinking, neither must we leave
abstraction entirely out of the picture. For what Brooks refers to as “abstraction” bears
some resemblance to the “world-forming” activity of human beings.
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Consider what it means to say that the bee has its own particular Merkwelt. The
bee is able to attend to a certain very specific set of beings, and then only in particular
prescribed ways. The bee cannot function outside of its preferred environment. When
the bee is kept in a dark enclosure until the sun has changed position, its navigational
drive becomes useless and the bee flies off in the wrong direction. And while the bee
could be said to “use” the sun to navigate, the bee could never use the sun to tell time.
Man is world-forming precisely because he is not bound by a particular Merkwelt. Only
humans (or other world-forming beings) can produce new beings, not in the ontic sense
(as with tool-making), but in the ontological sense. Only world-forming beings can cause
the sun to appear in new ways, as a time-keeping tool, or a gaseous celestial body. It is
man’s world-forming ability which allows him to adapt to new environments, with new
ways of seeing and thinking.

4.3 Searle revisited
The phenomenological distinction between world-poor and world-forming beings
also helps us sort through some of the muddled thinking of John Searle regarding
intentionality and meaning. Recall that in his Chinese Room thought experiment, Searle
claimed that a person who used only a set of formal rules to generate correct answers to
written Chinese questions could not truly be said to “understand” Chinese. Likewise,
Searle contended that a computer program, which does nothing more than manipulate
symbols, could never be said to think or understand. While Searle’s claims might seem
intuitive, he is at a loss to explain exactly why the machine does not understand. He
claims that “symbol manipulations by themselves don’t have any intentionality” (Searle
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199), and that only something with “the same causal powers as brains” (203) is capable
of thought. His final conclusion is that intentionality “is a biological phenomenon”
resulting from the particular biochemistry of human beings (204).
If we adopt Heidegger’s view, we can avoid the ambiguity of the term
“intentionality”, as well as the surprising conclusion that thought must be rooted in
biochemistry. Where Searle uses the term “intentionality,” or directedness, Heidegger
would identify at least two ways in which a being can be directed toward another:
captivation (as the bee is captivated by the sun), and comportment (as a human being
comports himself towards the sun). Comportment is possible only for world-forming
beings, while the world-poor are capable only of captivation.
It should be clear that Roger Schank’s programs, which inspired Searle’s Chinese
Room scenario, are at best world-poor. Schank’s programs are designed to take as their
input stories about a particular topic (specifically, restaurants) as well as a certain
prescribed set of questions about that topic. Just as the bee is restricted to its own beeworld, able to function only in a specific environment, so are Schank’s machines limited
to their own world. They are captivated by certain symbols, but can never comport
themselves to those symbols, or to the things those symbols represent. When removed
from their prescribed domain, Schank’s machines are as unable to function properly as
are the bees when the sun is hidden. The machines’ incapability to understand is not due
to the fact that they lack “intentionality,” but that they are poor in world.
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4.4 World formation, organs, and physiology
What, then, is needed for a being to be world-forming? Is biology a factor? Both
Searle on one hand, and Winograd and Flores on the other, seem to think that human
thought or cognition is somehow dependent on human physiology or biochemistry. The
question of whether a claim like “Man is world-forming” could depend on biological
claims calls to mind the circular movement discussed in Fundamental Concepts of
Metaphysics. For if we say that a human being’s world, or his capacity for worldformation, is due to his having certain types of neurons, on what do we base this
assertion? Aren’t neurons themselves phenomena, and isn’t the science which discovers
them the result of man’s world-forming essence?
The question of the role of physiology essentially asks whether our mental
capacities are dependent on our organs, and whether the functioning of our organs can be
reduced to physics or chemistry. To answer it, we must return to Fundamental Concepts
of Metaphysics, where Heidegger asks this very question. In considering the question of
the proper delimiting of the field of zoology, Heidegger comes across the traditional
distinction between the “organic” and the “inorganic.” This raises the question: What is
organic? What is an organism? Heidegger replies, “An organism is something which
possesses organs. The word ‘organ’ derives from the Greek !"#$%!% or ‘instrument’”
(FCM 213).
It is important at this point to recall the important role that instrumentality plays in
Heidegger’s phenomenology. An “instrument” for Heidegger is not an object that stands
over and against the user. An instrument, when in use, is absorbed in the activity, and is
only noticed as an object when it fails to perform its function. Equipment, instruments,
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and machines “are neither simply worldless, like the stone, nor are they ever poor in
world [. . . They] are worldless, yet as worldless belong to world” (213). Instruments are
a product of human activity, and are thus dependent on man’s capacity for worldformation. This dependence is ontical, not ontological: we do not mean that instruments
must be a product of human activity in the sense that they must be manufactured. A rock
that is picked up and used as a hammer is an instrument, even though it was not fashioned
by man. However, it exists as an instrument, as a hammer, by virtue of the human
activity of hammering.
The activity always precedes the instrument. A hammer exists for hammering;
thus the “for-hammering” is a necessary condition of the hammer. “All equipment is
what it is and the way it is only within a particular context. This context is determined by
a totality of involvements [Bewandtnisganzheit] in each case” (215).
Heidegger next considers the question of whether an organ is an
instrument. Were this the case, we would have to conclude, perhaps contrary to intuition,
that even biological organs are dependent upon the activity for which they are used.
More precisely, Heidegger asks, “Can the animal see because it has eyes, or does it have
eyes because it can see?” He concludes that “It is the potentiality for seeing which first
makes the possession of eyes possible”. This raises a more fundamental question: “How
must a being be in the first place, such that this possibility of the potentiality for seeing
can belong to its specific manner of being?” (218)
Whatever makes seeing possible must not rest on mere physiology. Animal
seeing and human seeing are not the same thing, despite the fact that “human beings and
animals both possess eyes and even the anatomical structure of the eye is alike in both
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cases.” Furthermore, even if we consider only animal seeing, there is an important
distinction between the eye as an animal’s organ of sight and the pen as an instrument of
writing, a distinction which goes beyond the simple fact that the two are intended for
different sorts of activity: “The pen is an independent being, something that is to hand
for use by various different human beings. The eye, on the contrary, as an organ is never
present at hand in this way for those beings that need and use it.” Heidegger is now able
to define organ provisionally as “an instrument which is incorporated into the user”
(219).
Already we can see a potential problem for the reductionist who wishes to ground
human mental activity in neurophysiology. When a scientist examines brain cells or
nerve tissue in an attempt to discover what makes thought possible, the cells and tissue
under investigation are not the same as the cells and tissue being used to ponder the
problem. This is true not just in the trivial sense that a doctor cannot examine his own
brain while he is using it. Rather, the objects of study are a fundamentally different kind
of being from the brain and nerves in use, as organs or instruments. They appear in
different ways, just as the hammer in use appears as an item of gear rather than as a
distinct object. Brain cells and nerve tissue only appear to the neuroscientist as objects
because he is involved in the kind of activity that makes them appear as such. The
radical move of phenomenology was to start not with a theoretical understanding, in
which the world is understood as a collection of physical objects into which the person
must somehow be made to fit, but with experience itself. Any attempt to explain
phenomenological experience in terms of present-at-hand objects neglects the very
purpose of phenomenology.
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Nevertheless, scientific investigation may still serve a purpose, and Heidegger
draws an example from biology to illustrate his point about the priority of activity over
organs. He considers the case of one-celled creatures, amoebae and infusoria. In these
creatures there are few, if any, permanent organs, only pseudopods: “They have to form
their necessary organs individually in each case, only to destroy them again in turn.”
Quoting von Uexküll, Heidegger explains that these creatures feed by forming, around
the food, “an aperture which first becomes a mouth, then a stomach, then an intestine and
finally an anal tract.” Heidegger then concludes “that the capacities for feeding and for
digesting are prior to the organs in each case” (224).
Despite the similarities between organs and instruments, Heidegger is not quite
ready to view organs as simply a special case of instruments – as instruments that happen
to be attached to their user, for example. In considering organs to be instruments, one
“fails to consider the organ in terms of the organism.” When the organism is considered
in the proper fashion, “the specific manner of being proper to living beings does
announce itself” (225).
The organ does not relate to its activity in quite the same way as does equipment.
“The eye is not serviceable for seeing in the way in which the pen is serviceable for
writing. Rather the organ stands in service of the capacity that develops it” (226). A
completed piece of equipment is serviceable for something, but the organ is subservient
to its capacity. Heidegger goes on to distinguish between “readiness for something and
capacity for something. A piece of equipment like a pen, for example, is ready for
writing but it is not capable of writing” (227). Neither is an eye capable of seeing, except
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as it is considered as part of the organism to which it belongs. Capacity belongs to
organism, and organs belong to capacity.

4.5 Conclusion
What can Heidegger’s investigation of the nature of organs and organisms tell us
about the proper relationship between phenomenology and cognitive science? How is the
scientific study of mind to proceed if it is to be valuable from a phenomenological
standpoint? For one thing, we must not attempt to understand the mind by breaking it
down into parts. An organism is more than just a collection of organs, and the organs
cannot be understood except in terms of the organism. Just as the Victorian phrenologists
had an improper conception of the brain, which posited the existence of a number of
discrete cerebral organs corresponding to each human faculty or virtue, so, too, do
cognitive scientists misunderstand the mind when they try too hard to break its
functioning down into discrete subsystems. The failure of the traditional approach to
artificial intelligence, with its high level of abstraction, was to treat the mind as a sort of
central processing device which could be hooked up to a number of natural or artificial
sense organs.
We also must not proceed as if the mind were nothing more than a level of
explanation above the physical. It is wrong to think that we have not “really” explained
some mental faculty until we have accounted for it in physiological terms. The mind (in
the sense of one’s mental faculties) and the brain (in the sense of physiology) are
ontologically distinct. When the phenomenologist asks, “How is it that this being has
some particular capacity?” he is dealing with a different set of beings entirely than the
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scientist who asks, “What physical system could produce this sort of behavior?” If a
scientific study of the mind is to be grounded in a phenomenological understanding, it
must ask a different sort of questions than the reductionist or the behaviorist. The study
of the behavior of humans or animals must seek to answer the question, “What sort of
being is capable of this behavior?” Likewise, the neurophysiologist, in studying some
part of the brain or nervous system, must ask, “What capacity makes such an organ
possible?” In short, the physical must be explained in terms of the phenomenological,
rather than the other way around.
There is still a long way to go before there can be any serious cooperation
between phenomenology and cognitive science. The two fields have as their objects very
different sorts of beings. Yet hopefully we have seen that the notion of using science to
inform phenomenology is not a misguided one. As long as phenomenological
investigation and scientific experimentation are kept in their proper relationship to one
another, the two can be used together as powerful tools for understanding ourselves and
our faculties.
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